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Party competition and positions on immigration: strategic advantages and 
spatial location1.  
 
 
Abstract 
The literature on party competition suggests that traditional conflict lines have either 
become obsolete or been replaced by new, less stable, ones. This development points 
to how political conflict has changed but also to how certain policy positions can be 
problematic to explain when these are linked to parties’ location on ‘Old’ and ‘New’ 
conflict dimensions. A particularly difficult issue has been party position(s) on 
immigration. Solely focusing on parties’ spatial location – on either conflict 
dimension – is insufficient for understanding the position that parties adopt. The 
article argues that a more fruitful approach is to simultaneously consider the degree of 
ownership – the strategic advantage – that parties have on particular conflict 
dimensions and parties’ spatial location therein. Comparing parties in Britain and 
Sweden, the article explores the extent to which this framework explains party 
positioning in two institutionally different contexts.  
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Introduction 
 
Party competition has changed significantly over the past decades (Dalton, 2002; 
Clark, 2008). These changes affect how parties interact with each other and the 
positions they take (Budge et al, 2001). However, certain policy stances are difficult 
to understand in the light of these changes. The contradictory positions that parties 
adopt on immigration are indicative of the challenges to understand the changing 
relationship between ideology and policy positioning. On the one hand, immigration 
‘messes’ up party classification (Benoit and Laver, 2007; Budge et al, 2001). Parties 
that are supposed to be on the ‘Right’ are suddenly on the ‘Left’ (and vice versa) once 
immigration is taken into account. On the other, when parties change their ideological 
position, they do not necessarily change their position on immigration (Breunig and 
Luedtke, 2008).  
 What makes the ‘immigration issue’ so problematic is its diverse and illusive 
nature (Lahav, 1997). Consequently, parties find it difficult to accommodate 
immigration within either an ‘Old’ – economic – or ‘New’ – socio-cultural – conflict 
dimension (see Hooghe, et al. 2002; Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1987, 1990; 1997, 
Kitschelt, 2004; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al, 2006). Therefore, parties 
may end up adopting similar positions on immigration even though their Left-Right 
position indicates otherwise. This situation poses problems for spatial-theory 
explanations as well as for understanding the role of ideology in political systems.  
At the same time, parties appear to be less ideologically divided (Green-
Pedersen, 2007). Increasing goal consensus suggests that competition revolves around 
the means used and competency, rather than proximity to voters’ preferences; Budge 
et al, 2001). Consequently, parties tend to be trusted on an issue or set of issues which 
they have a long-standing commitment and association to. Although cleavages may be 
less apparent or important, parties can still be positively or negatively associated with 
issues that correspond to ‘Old’ and ‘New’ conflict dimensions and, over time, develop 
different levels of aggregated ‘macro-competence’ on these (Jennings and Green, 
2009). While Jennings and Green do not consider competence on distinct conflict 
dimensions, parties can become comparatively stronger, and more trusted, on specific 
conflict dimensions thus developing degrees of ownership – i.e. a strategic advantage 
- on these.  
  
Although immigration is usually a contested issue, it nevertheless displays certain 
valance characteristics. Mainstream parties, albeit not always the electorate, tend to 
agree on the direction of immigration policy. Since parties rarely appear to change 
ideological position in response to changes in public opinion (Budge, 1994, Adams et 
al, 2004), positioning seems more related to the changing dynamics of party 
competition. Competition around immigration is thus expected to be around which 
party that is ‘better’ at delivering this goal and how parties communicate this 
effectively to the electorate. 
However, immigration can also, much like European integration (Hooghe et 
al, 2002), be an orthogonal issue. Therefore, parties need to assimilate – and frame – 
immigration so it corresponds to the position on the conflict dimension where they 
have a strategic advantage. E.g. if a party occupies a market-liberal position and is 
perceived to be, overall, more competent on economic issues, then their position on 
immigration will be framed in a way that is compatible with this ideological 
orientation and conflict dimensional advantage. The presence of issue competition 
does not always mean the absence of positional competition. Instead, both types of 
competition usually co-exist (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). This suggests 
that even parties that offer a positioning choice behave in the same way and will 
frame their alternative so it is compatible with this combination of strategic 
advantage/spatial location.  
Studying parties’ relative degree of ownership, in the form of strategic 
advantages, highlights the inherent ‘either/or’ scenario that issue ownership theory 
assumes - either a party owns an issue/set of issues or it does not. This dichotomy 
becomes problematic if ownership scores are very close. Focusing on strategic 
advantages and spatial locations is of further importance since traditional 
conceptualisations of ownership primarily deal with why certain issues are 
emphasised rather than the determinants behind adopted positions.  
In order to test the article’s hypothesis, a majoritarian (Britain) and a 
proportional democracy (Sweden) are compared. The British electoral system usually 
creates a government consisting of a single party that has parliamentary majority 
whereas in the Swedish proportional system, minority or coalition governments are 
the norm. The British ‘first-past-the-post’-system furthermore punishes extreme 
policy positions whereas the Swedish system allows for more polarisation between 
parties. Swedish politics also permits the opposition to exercise more influence on 
  
policy compared to the British case. In the latter, the government exercises a greater 
domination over parliament and the parliamentary committees, although the size of 
the government determines the degree of influence (see also Hobolt and Klemmensen, 
2005). While an incumbency-advantage is present in both cases, it is much more 
linked to a particular party in Britain since the political institutions usually create a 
single-party government. Being the party in office is often associated with certain 
advantages, such as name recognition, which, in turn, may be reflected in how the 
public views party competence (Clark, 2008). The two cases are thus ideal since they 
differ in terms of their politico-institutional settings and thus allows the article’s 
theoretical approach to ‘travel’. 
Given the theoretical assumptions and choice of cases, the article proposes the 
following hypothesis.  
 
H1. Parties will frame their position on immigration (liberal/restrictive) so it 
corresponds to the ideological position (centre-left/centre-right) on the conflict 
dimension (‘Old’/’New’ politics) where they have a strategic advantage.    
 
 
If the findings supports the hypothesis then parties play primarily to their strengths 
and are less influenced, and constrained, by context specific institutional factors.  
 
 
 
Dynamics of party competition  
 
Spatial theory (Downs, 1957) assumes that parties maximise votes by adopting 
discrete positions across a policy dimension. Policy positioning and change thereof 
comes about in the pursuit of votes where electoral feedback allows parties to take 
calculated risks (Budge, 1994). Different electoral systems either push parties towards 
the median voter (two-party systems) or polarise them (in multi-party systems)2.  
Although proximity motivations are important for party choice, voters are also 
influenced by various non-policy factors, e.g. party loyalty or religion. Accordingly, 
parties and candidates have an incentive to appeal on policy grounds to voters who are 
  
biased toward them for non-policy reasons (Adams and Merrill, 1999). Parties may 
also be evaluated according to policy direction, rather than proximity, and will 
therefore offer similar, but more extreme, policy positions than those held by their 
supporters (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989).  
However, parties do not always compete on the ‘positional-dimension’. If 
agreement prevails on policy goals, political struggle takes place along the ‘valence-
dimension’ (Stokes, 1963; Green, 2007). A valence approach, Stokes noted, is 
particularly important for the understanding of political competition when ideological 
polarisation declines. Increasing issue consensus means that parties are judged on 
performance delivery rather than on the choices they offer (see also van der Brug, 
2004). When valence issues are at stake, parties tend to occupy the same policy space 
but drawing attention to an issue where there is more or less full agreement is not 
always an optimal vote winning solution (Riker, 1996). Therefore, parties tend to 
emphasise differences in terms of how to achieve the valence issue goals (Petrocik, 
1996). These differences are ideologically motivated but also relate to parties’ past 
performance and reputation on the issue where this ‘track record’ generates trust on a 
specific issue or issues. Parties will then selectively emphasise issues on which they 
have a strategic advantage, or that they ‘own’, while de-emphasising others (Budge 
and Farlie, 1983). Since issue competence levels usually work in tandem (Jennings 
and Green, 2009), parties are able to build up trust and proficiency on a set of issues 
that are associated with specific conflict dimensions. This makes parties more likely 
to emphasise one dimension over the other and the solutions they propose will be 
compatible with this dimension and the spatial location therein  
Consequently, parties tend to behave in two ways. First, following the 
principle of dispersion, if a proposed solution is negatively associated with the 
valence issue, a party draws attention away from it even though voters may rank that 
issue highly. Second, according to the principle of dominance, the party will instead 
draw attention to an issue where the electorate agrees with their solution (Riker, 
1996). While immigration does not constitute a valence issue per se - elite and public 
views often differ - it nevertheless contains valence elements since mainstream parties 
usually agree on the direction of immigration policy (Dummett, 2005) but differ on 
how to get there.   
Through a comparison of mainstream parties in Britain and Sweden, the article 
explores the changing dynamics of party competition and positioning on immigration. 
  
This is done in three stages. First, spatial location (centre-left/centre-right; 
liberal/restrictive) on two ideological dimensions (‘Old’/’New’ politics) and one issue 
dimension (‘immigration’) is calculated by using a modified version of the Pellikaan-
model (Pellikaan et al, 2003). Second, the article calculates parties’ strategic 
advantage scores on both ideological dimensions and finally, the hypothesis is tested. 
 
 
 
Operationalisation  
 
The article invokes manifestos for the analyses of parties’ spatio-ideological location 
and position on immigration. Studying manifestos is a central data source since they 
“assess the importance of current political problems, specify the party’s position on 
them, and inform the electorate about the course of action the party will pursue when 
elected” (Klingemann, 1987:300). Although parties also discuss and disseminate 
issues elsewhere, manifestos have the advantage of putting forward the aggregate 
party position even though, obviously, individual members and representatives may 
disagree with the official party line3. To measure party location on the ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ conflict dimensions, the article takes the model developed by Pellikaan et al 
(2003; see also De Lange, 2007) as a starting point. The model measures the extent of 
confrontation between parties on these two dimensions4. The Pellikaan-model extends 
Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) idea of the ‘two-dimensional party space’ and defines 
the ‘Old’ Left-Right dimension as “opposition//…//between statements favouring the 
‘political redistribution’ of economic resources//…//and statements favouring the 
‘market allocation’ of resources” (1995:1). Following De Lange (2007), the central 
indicators for the ‘Old’ Left-Right dimension are: 1) Privatisation, 2) Public Sector, 3) 
Welfare and Social Security System, 4) Labour Market, 5) Taxation, 6) Budget 
Deficit and 7) Trade and Enterprise policies.  
  A word search is carried out for the relevant indicators and associated quasi-
sentences are then evaluated in order to score the indicated position. De Lange 
suggests that when statements “predominantly indicate that a party is in favour of 
state intervention//…//this party receives a score of -1 on that specific issue” 
(2007:420). Conversely, when it indicates that the party is in favour of more market 
  
influence, a score of +1 is given. When the overall statement is unclear or ambiguous, 
a score of 0 is given. However, the ‘more state-more market’ – dichotomy does not 
always make sense on some of the key indicators, for example on taxes. Therefore, 
this article makes a few adjustments to the way that the scores are calculated. On 
indicators 4 and 7, scores are allocated as to whether the manifesto indicates more (-1) 
or less regulation (+1). Similarly, indicator 5 is coded according to whether the 
manifesto advocates raising (-1) or lowering (+1) taxes whereas on indicator 6, a 
statement that advocates more public spending is given a score of -1 and less public 
spending is given a score of +1.  
  De Lange’s operationalisation of the ‘New’ politics dimension is more 
complicated since it “encompasses several political questions” (2007:420) and suffers 
from a lack of consensus on what the key indicators should be (see e.g. Inglehart, 
1990; Franklin and Rüdig, 1992). De Lange, however, maintains that Kitschelt’s three 
central elements (citizenship/ethnocultural relations; individual freedoms and 
collective decision making) need to be kept. Further complications arise from how 
‘immigration’ and ‘integration of cultural minorities’ are used to measure 
‘citizenship/ethnocultural relations’. De Lange’s definition, “statements indicating 
support for an inclusive and universalistic society [or] support for an exclusive and 
particularistic society” (2007:420), is more relevant for party attitudes on ‘integration’ 
and does not fully capture ‘immigration’. There is also some overlap between 
capturing party attitudes’ on integration and national identity.  
  Furthermore, none of the indicators captures the perhaps key ‘New’ politics 
concern – environmental protection vs. economic growth. Therefore, the article 
modifies the second dimension so it clearly covers ‘integration’, ‘the environment’ 
and ‘national identity’ in addition to ‘individual freedom’ (‘diversity of 
lifestyles’/‘ethical legislation) and ‘collective decision modes’ (‘direct 
representation’/‘participation in the decision-making processes’). This also provides a 
better comparative fit since both dimensions now include an equal number of 
measurement points.  
  Scores are given according to whether the manifesto indicates diversity of 
lifestyles to be positive (-1) or negative (+1); favours individual freedom (-1) or a 
moralistic government (+1); favours direct (-1) or appointed representation (+1); 
favours more individual participation in decision-making (-1) or more hierarchical 
decision-making procedures (+1); national identity5 to be less important (or inclusive) 
  
(-1) or more important (or exclusive) (+1); Integration: inclusive and universalistic (-
1) or exclusive and particularistic (+1); environmental protection (-1) or economic 
growth to be more important (+1).  
A separate 7-point scale is set up to measure party position on immigration. To 
capture the full range of migratory types, six distinct categories6 are used plus a 
seventh (‘Immigration (in general)’) which encompasses any mentions of immigration 
not covered by the other categories.  All categories, except ‘Immigration (in general)’ 
and ‘Student migration’, are scored according to whether policy should be more 
liberal (-1) or more restrictive (+1). The former two are scored according to whether 
the issues are considered to have a positive (-1) or negative (+1) effect on society. 
This way of measuring provides a more nuanced picture of parties’ position on 
immigration compared to the standard measurement used by the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP). The CMP’s indicators for immigration - ‘Underprivileged 
Minority Groups: Positive’ and ‘Multiculturalism: Positive/Negative’ – do, again, not 
capture parties’ positions on immigration as they do positions on integration (Budge, 
2001; Klingemann et al, 2006). 
Finally, in order to measure degrees of ownership – strategic advantage - on 
the ‘Old’ Left-Right dimension, three identical indicators are used– unemployment, 
taxes and managing the economy. For the ‘New’ Left-Right dimension, however, only 
two identical indicators have been found - environment and law and order7 (Holmberg 
et al. 1991-2006; Ipsos-Mori, 2009). The scores are calculated by ‘simply subtracting 
one party’s ‘best party’ percentage from the percentage for the party with which it is 
compared” (Green and Hobolt, 2008:465). This gives a final strategic advantage score 
on each dimension which allows for an evaluation of the degree of ownership in 
conjunction with the spatial location calculated earlier. Parties were then scored and 
ranked according to their advantage over other parties. This in effect gives five 
distinct categories of competence: 1) Ownership (party scores ≥ 20 per cent than the 
other parties); 2) Advantage (scores ≥ 10 but ≤ 20 per cent); 3) Relative Advantage 
(score is ≥ 5 but ≤ 10 per cent) 4) Gamble (score is ‘close’ (-5 to +5 per cent) and 5) 
No Advantage (party scores ≥ - 5). Scores are then allocated to each category 
(5=Ownership to 1=No ownership), added up and divided by the number of parties 
which gives a final classification of parties’ strategic advantage. E.g. in 1991, the Left 
Party scores an average of 1.5 points thus falling into the ‘Gamble’ category (3 
‘Gambles’ a 2 points and 3 ‘No advantage’ a 1 point/6 parties) (see further Table. 1). 
  
Discussion 
 
 Party positions on ‘Old’ and ‘New’ conflict dimensions. 
 
Calculating parties’ position on the two conflict dimensions (‘Old’ and ‘New’) reveals 
two things. First, the countries reverse mirror each other in terms of how the political 
space is organised (see Figures. 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b). The Swedish ‘Old’ politics scale 
shows a relatively even spread but with a clear bloc division. This situation is 
pronounced after 1994 when the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats more 
clearly establish themselves on the ‘right’. The British parties have moved towards 
the same ideological space on the ‘Old’ right, a situation which is consolidated post-
1997. In both cases, party location is as expected given the electoral systems where an 
FPTP-system forces parties to become more similar (Britain) and where a PR-system 
allows for more polarisation (Sweden).  
The significant shift by the Moderates towards the centre ground has since 
2002 led to a re-shuffling of the political space with the Liberals taking over as the 
main ‘Old’ right party, with the Centre Party, and the Christian Democrats occupying 
the space in between. This has in turn forced the Social Democrats further to the left 
(-3 in 2006 compared to 0 in 2002) and the Left Party to firmly ground their position 
on the left flank (-6 in 2002 and 2006).  The Greens are, bar 2006, consistently placed 
inbetween the Social Democrats and the Left Party on the Old ‘left’.  
On the ‘New’ politics dimension, however, the situation is the reverse. The 
British parties are more evenly spread across this dimension although Labour (0 in 
1992, -2 in 1997, -1 in 2001 and 2005) and the Conservatives (2 in 1992 and 1997, -1 
in 2001 and 0 in 2005) have started to move closer to each other, making the 
Conservatives a much less obvious ‘New’ right party. The Liberal Democrats have, in 
contrast, clearly positioned themselves as the ‘New’ left alternative (-2 in 1992, -1 in 
1997, -6 in 2001 and -4 in 2005). The Swedish parties, by and large, occupy the same 
‘New’ left space. The Christian Democrats hold ‘New’ right positions during three 
time periods (+1 in 1991, 1998 and 2006) but a ‘New’ left position in 2002 (-2). The 
Moderates start out as a clear ‘New’ right alternative (+2 in 1991) but move gradually 
to the ‘New’ left (-1 in 2006). This development also leads to a positional reshuffle 
and the Moderates come to occupy the same ‘New’ left space as the Greens and the 
  
Left Party in 2006. In contrast, the Liberals and Christian Democrats move towards a 
‘New’ right position (+1 for both parties). The Social Democrats, on the other hand, 
regularly shift positions but come to occupy the centre ground in 20068.  
 
 
 
Party positions on immigration 
 
What positions do parties hold when it comes to immigration (see Figure. 3a and 3b)? 
In Britain, the Liberal Democrats consistently occupy the ‘liberal’ policy space (-2 in 
1992 and 1997 to -3 in 2001 and 2005) while the Conservatives hold overall 
restrictive positions (+2 in 1992, +1 in 1997 and 2005, 0 in 2001). Labour also hold 
restrictive positions (+1 in 1992 and 1997), but perform a drastic turn in a liberal 
direction in 2001 (-4) only to return to a restrictive position in 2005 (+1). This in 
effect gives us two outcomes. On the one hand, ‘positioning’-alternatives between the 
‘restrictive’ Labour and Conservative Party and the ‘liberal’ Liberal Democrats (1992, 
1997 and 2005) and then between by the ‘liberal’ Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
and the ‘restrictive’ Conservatives in 2001. On the other, ‘ownership’-alternatives 
between the ‘restrictive’ Labour and Conservatives (1992, 1997 and 2005) and then 
between the ‘liberal’ Labour and the Liberal Democrats (2001).  
 In Sweden, the situation is the reverse and parties cluster around the centre-
ground or a liberal policy position (-1 to -3). There is also a remarkable degree of 
uniform behaviour and an average of four parties occupy the same position across the 
studied time-periods. The absence of a clear ‘restrictive’ policy alternative further 
suggests that competition on ‘the immigration issue’ in Sweden is more about 
competence and less about positioning.  
 
 
 
Parties’ strategic advantages on ‘Old’ and ‘New’ conflict dimensions  
 
Although issue ownership explains priorities that parties make and why they choose 
to emphasize and campaign on immigration, it does not fully explain why e.g. a liberal 
  
position is adopted as opposed to a more restrictive one. Therefore, it is necessary to 
look at the interplay between conflict dimensional advantages, ideological positions 
and positions on immigration. The strategic advantage that parties enjoy on particular 
conflict dimensions are particularly important since issue competence ratings tend to 
work in tandem (Jennings and Green, 2009). That is, when parties gain, or lose, on 
one dimensional issue, it usually reflects a similar change on other issues within the 
same sphere. The assumption is that the strategic advantage/spatial location 
combination is used by parties to justify their position on immigration. E.g. when a 
centre-left party is perceived to be more competent on the ‘Old’ conflict dimension, 
they are more likely to frame their stance on immigration in a way that is compatible 
with their position on that dimension.  
As Table. 1 shows, the Social Democrats dominate the ‘Old’ politics 
dimension on all occasions, bar 2006, with the Moderates in second place. Whereas 
the Social Democrats’ and the Moderates’ scores are fairly stable over time, the five 
smaller parties show more volatility. In particular, the Left Party, the Liberals and the 
Greens’ scores vary quite drastically and include a high number of ‘Gamble’-
positions. The Christian Democrats are, overall, the ‘third’ choice whereas the Centre 
Party is almost exclusively seen as the least competent party on the ‘Old’ Left-Right 
dimension.  
Conversely, competence scores on the ‘New’ politics dimension are very 
different. The Green Party ‘owns’ this dimension on four occasions with the 
Moderates, once again, in second place but with the Centre Party as the ‘third option’. 
The Social Democrats ‘drop’ to fourth place, performing slightly better than the 
Christian Democrats. The Liberals and the Left Party fall into a separate category by 
having three and four occasions respectively where they are severely disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis the other parties (i.e. ‘No ownership’). Again, the number of ‘Gamble’ 
positions is high.  
The British data shows that competition on both dimensions has primarily 
been between Labour and the Conservatives with the former taking over ownership of 
the ‘Old’ politics dimension in 1997. The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, have 
a consistent disadvantage vis-à-vis the other parties. However, in 2005 the distance to 
the Conservatives almost halves (from -30 in 2001 to -17 in 2005). 
On the ‘New’ politics dimension, the differences are less clear cut. Although 
the Conservatives own this dimension on two occasions (1992 and 2005), their 
  
advantage is not as significant as Labour’s scores on the ‘Old’ politics dimension and 
in 2001, for example, there was no difference between the two. While still being in a 
disadvantaged position, Liberal Democrats, perform comparatively better on the 
‘New’ politics dimension (on average, -17 points difference compared to -62).  
 
The article’s main claim is now tested and to reiterate the hypothesis goes as follows:  
 
H1. Parties will frame their position on immigration (liberal/restrictive) so it 
corresponds to the ideological position (centre-left/centre-right) on the conflict 
dimension (‘Old’/’New’ politics) where they have a strategic advantage.    
 
The British parties perform as expected during three out of the four elections studied. 
In 1992, the Conservative Party is assumed to frame their policy as a matter of ‘New’, 
centre-right politics but use both ‘Old’, centre-right and ‘New’, centre-right language. 
On asylum the manifesto states that it needs to be “faster and more effective” 
indicating an ‘Old’, centre-right right approach but it also mentions “finger-
printing//…//to prevent multiple applications and benefit fraud” which points to a 
very strong ‘New’, centre-right emphasis. It is also assumed that competition will be 
ownership oriented between the Conservatives and Labour but the Conservative 
manifesto rather indicates a positioning alternative when writing “we 
must//…//reintroduce the Asylum Bill, opposed by Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats”. This doubtfulness is underscored by Labour’s position, ‘[a] new Act will 
guarantee sanctuary to genuine refugees but prevent bogus applications for asylum’ 
which suggests that Labour is not opposed to the Bill as such. The quote also points to 
a ‘New’, centre-right approach rather than the expected ‘Old’, centre-left. On the 
other hand, The Liberals Democrats behaved as expected and provided a ‘New’, 
centre-left justification for their liberal policy stance, “[w]e will introduce improved 
welfare and legal rights for genuine asylum seekers and establish substantive rights of 
appeal”. 
In 1997, the Conservatives are again assumed to frame their immigration 
policy in a ‘New’, centre-right discourse, which their policy stance - “while genuine 
asylum seekers are treated sympathetically, people do not abuse these provisions to 
avoid normal immigration controls” – clearly points to. The Labour manifesto does as 
well frame their policy in the expected strategic advantage discourse – “We 
  
will//…//ensure swift and fair decisions on whether someone can stay or go” which, 
again, should be “dealt with speedily” since the – Conservative - system is “expensive 
and slow”.  The Liberal Democrats, once again, provide the positioning alternative 
when professing that they would “restore benefit rights to asylum seekers”.  
In 2001, ownership competition is assumed to shift towards being between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Both parties offer very similar policies, all of 
which push for a liberalisation of immigration regulations but with very different 
focal points. On the one hand, for economic benefits (“help ensure that those who 
come and work here continue to make a major contribution to our economic and 
social life” (Labour) and, on the other, for human rights concerns (“fair benefits for 
asylum seekers to replace the demeaning voucher system” (Liberal Democrats). 
Again, these justifications correspond to where Labour and the Liberal Democrats are 
located spatially on the dimension which they are more competent on (or ‘not as bad’ 
in the case of the Liberal Democrats), ‘Old’, centre-right in the former and ‘New’, 
centre-left in the latter. The Conservatives, on the other hand, provide the alternative 
position and, despite making a move in a liberal direction, very clearly emphasise the 
party as being the choice for voters wanting stricter immigration controls.  
By 2005, the Conservatives had not owned the ‘Old’ politics dimension since 
1992 but regain control over the ‘New’ politics dimension. They also move towards 
more restrictive immigration policies (0 in 2001; +1 in 2005) as well as towards the 
‘New’ centre-right (-1 in 2001, 0 in 2005). The manifesto thus focuses on 
safeguarding the population from disease (“health checks for immigrants”) and 
maintaining sovereignty (“take back powers from Brussels//…// withdraw from the 
1951 Geneva Convention”). Immigration clearly becomes a matter of ownership 
competition during the 2005 election campaign (Jennings and Green, 2009) as 
exemplified by several ownership phrases, e.g. “bring immigration back under 
control” and “[r]efusing to set a limit on new migrants is irresponsible politics. Only 
the Conservatives take this issue seriously”.   
Labour also moves in a restrictive direction but emphasise a managed 
migration system rather than restricting entry as such (“establish a points system for 
those seeking to migrate here.”) and their effectiveness in dealing with asylum 
applications (“[t]he backlog of claims has been cut”) thus corresponding to their 
location (centre-right) and strategic advantage (‘Old’ politics). The Liberal Democrats 
did, again, provide a positioning choice when emphasising that they “support a 
  
liberal//…//approach to migration”. However, the Liberal Democrats go against 
expected behaviour with their use of an ‘Old’, centre-right discourse. Thus, one finds 
favourable descriptions of allowing for more business influence in deciding on the 
appropriate levels of work permits.  
The Swedish parties perform as expected in just over a third of the cases but 
show significant inter-party differences. The Greens and the Moderates perform 
significantly above average (sixty and eighty per cent respectively) while the Liberals 
and the Centre Party perform slightly above average (forty per cent). The Social 
Democrats only act as predicted on one occasion while the Christian Democrats and 
the Left Party consistently go against expected behaviour. Of interest is that the 
Swedish parties rarely frame their policies as ‘being better’ than any of their 
opponents. Instead they offer normative alternatives which criticise state rather than 
party policy, e.g. “Sweden's refugee policy//…//is today a failure from a humanitarian 
point of view (Left Party, 1998) and “Sweden does at present not live up to a decent 
and humanitarian treatment of refugees” (Greens, 2002).  
The Moderates, with a consistent centre-right position and strong competence 
scores on the ‘Old’ politics dimension, thus justify their liberal position with reference 
to less state interference (e.g. “We want to increase the possibilities for those who 
wish to immigrate for work purposes.” (1991). The Greens, on the other hand, with a 
clear centre-left profile, and consistent ownership over the ‘New’ politics dimension, 
emphasise that immigration policy “needs to be more humane” (2006).  
The Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Christian Democrats stand out 
by going against expected behaviour. The three parties, by and large, only mention 
that immigration, and in particular asylum, policy needs to be “based on solidarity” 
(Left Party, 1991) or “characterised by solidarity” (Social Democrats, 2002). This is 
surprising, not only for the Social Democrats given their almost uniform ownership of 
the ‘Old’ politics dimension, but also for the Left Party with their high number of 
‘Gamble’ scores on the ‘New’ politics dimension. Similarly, the Christian Democrats 
are expected to utilise an ‘Old’, centre-right discourse but the findings suggest a 
‘New’, centre-left approach, e.g. “show solidarity//…//through a humane and 
generous asylum policy” (2002).  Finally, the Liberals with, high a number of 
‘Gamble’ scores, pursue a more cautious approach and only gamble when there is a 
clear advantage to do so (e.g. in 2002 and 2006). The Centre Party play down 
  
immigration in their manifestos and only begin to emphasise the issue in 2006 when 
their competence scores on the ‘Old’ politics dimension increase.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article examines the determinants behind party positions on immigration. The 
“immigration issue” has been difficult for parties to assimilate into existing conflict 
dimensions, especially so if competition is assumed to take place along two distinct 
cleavage lines. Previous studies find no clear relationship between changing 
ideological positions and changing positions on immigration. The latter might, 
however, be better explained by looking at a) parties’ degree of ownership over a 
conflict dimension and b) their spatial location on this dimension. This twin-track 
approach, the article argues, allows for a better understanding of why parties adopt 
particular policy positions on immigration. The subsequent analysis of British and 
Swedish parties show some degree of support for the hypothesis and parties in the 
former behave as expected more often than in the latter. However, the presence, albeit 
modest, of strategic advantage/spatial location justifications in Swedish politics points 
to how institutional settings and migration specific contexts may not always constrain 
and/or influence party action. The unexpected instances of this type of competition in 
a proportional system is thus indicative of the direction that party competition is 
heading.  
However, the analysis also gives rise to additional questions that need to be 
addressed in future studies. First, do parties consider one dimension as more 
important than the other? It was assumed that parties emphasis the dimension on 
which they have a strategic advantage but party systems tend to vary in terms of issue 
diversity (Hobolt et al, 2008; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). A closer examination 
of dimensional priorities in the light of agenda setting competition (Schattschneider, 
1960) and agenda ‘friction’ (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) is therefore necessary to 
explain these unexpected outcomes.  
Second, when classifying parties into the various categories of ownership, the 
analysis encountered a few grey cases. This is especially problematic in the Swedish 
  
case when some parties have a significant advantage over one or two parties but a 
reasonably big disadvantage vis-à-vis the remaining parties. This gives rise to an 
interpretation and classification problem where e.g. a “Relative advantage” position is 
less flexible than a “Gamble” which means that the expected party behaviour changes.  
Third, the article’s one-dimensional categorisation of immigration policy 
(liberal vs. restrictive) does not take into account that parties adopt different positions 
depending on the type of migration. This article uses the aggregate position that 
parties hold and studies whether this position is framed, and fits, with their conflict 
dimensional advantage and spatial location therein. A further sub-classification 
relating to economic (labour; student) and cultural aspects of migration (asylum, 
family reunification, unaccompanied minors as well as illegal/undocumented 
migration) is therefore necessary. It is reasonable to assume that depending on parties’ 
strategic advantage/spatial location, they will favour different types of approaches to 
these sub-categories as well. Indeed, the manifesto findings suggest that parties are 
selective with respect to the types of migration they choose to highlight.  
Fourth, party manifestos are in themselves limiting as several authors note (see 
e.g. Benoit et al, 2008; Bakker et al, 2006). Although providing the unified party 
view, they only focus on issues that are salient during elections times. Consequently, 
if immigration does not feature on the party radar during that particular election, it 
will not be covered in the manifesto and thus not receive a measurement score. A 
broader scope is necessary in order accurately capture parties’ positions on 
immigration. A related issue is whether manifestos in fact indicate party position as 
opposed to party direction (Pelizzo, 2003). Finally, the article does not discuss the 
influence of far-right parties, or that of certain contextual factors, on party positions 
(such as the unfeasibly large backlog of asylum applications in Britain; the ‘bogus-
asylum seeker’ debate or the re-evaluation of ‘economic migrants’ in the early 2000s). 
These are obviously important features for understanding policy choice and party 
competition but are also covered extensively elsewhere (see e.g. Freeman, 1997; 
Golder, 2003; Rydgren, 2005; Somerville, 2007; Spencer, 2007 and Jennings, 2009). 
However, by combining parties’ strategic advantage and spatial location, the article 
addresses the need for a systematic analysis for how parties handle and engage with 
“the immigration issue”.   
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2 Spatial theory contains a number of “ifs” and if one or more of these assumptions are violated, the 
expected convergence results tend to disappear (Grofman, 2004). 
3 Other, equally important, measurement techniques include “mass surveys of party voters, elite 
surveys of party politicians, dimensional analysis of the roll call voters of party legislators”. (Benoit 
and Laver, 2007: 90). It should also be noted that determining party position from manifestos is 
notoriously difficult (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Dinas and Gemenis, 2009; Franzmann and Kaiser, 
2007;). Furthermore, the article’s main aim is to analyse the determinants behind adopted positions on 
immigration since these prove to be problematic for previous studies that link ideological position to 
that of immigration. Although the use of, especially, the CMP data is ‘comforting but insufficient’ 
(King, 1990:1), the inclusion highlights the often overlooked complexities of reading party position on 
immigration from parties’ ideological position.  
4 The article’s approach differs from that of the CMP and the ESG (Benoit and Laver 2007; see also 
Laver and Hunt, 1992). While the CMP data directly reflects the stated party position and generates a 
rich time-series set (Budge and Pennings, 2007), it also contains significant methodological ‘noise’ 
since it conflates economic and social policy positions into one, unified left-right dimension, thus 
exaggerating the ideological move that parties make (Benoit and Laver, 2007). The ESG data tries to 
avoid the ‘mathematically constrained nature of the saliency-based CMP left-right measure’ (ibid, 
p.103) by asking country experts to classify parties on four substantive dimensions - economic, social, 
loci of decision-making and environmental policy - plus a ‘direct measure of party positions on a 
general left-right scale’ (ibid., p.91). Although the ESG allows for more flexibility in its measurements, 
the survey is limited by its current lack of comparative time points. Furthermore, the survey’s key 
finding suggest that ‘the substantive meaning of left-right is not constant’ (ibid, p.103) and appears to 
be highly context dependent. This raises further questions as to what type of comparative conclusions 
can actually be drawn about parties left-right position if the concept is not able to ‘travel’ between 
cases. 
5 Note: for the question on national identity, the Swedish manifestos tend to frame it as a cultural 
understanding of the issue, that is, is it seen as important to preserve national identity (+1) or not (-1) 
whereas the British manifestos relate to devolution (-1) vs. national unity (+1). 
6 1) Immigration (in general) + 2) Labour immigration + 3) Asylum seekers and refugees + 4) Family 
reunification + 5) Unaccompanied minors + 6) Student migration + 7) Retirement migration. 
7 Although ‘Law and order’ does not form part of the 7-point scale used for the ‘New’ politics 
dimension it nevertheless fits with the scale’s libertarian/authoritarian element.  
8 The calculations show a general directional fit with the CMP and ESG data. That is, the British and 
Swedish parties are placed in the same ideological space as the two comparative benchmarks. 
Furthermore, none of the parties fall into the “CMP says ‘Right’, ESG says ‘Left’- category. However, 
this article does, by and large, allocate parties a higher score. When party positions are compared, this 
article’s ranking corresponds to the ESG with one exception; the Liberals are here placed further to 
right of the Christian Democrats. The ranking of the British parties is, however, identical to both data 
sets. This would indicate that the calculations done here give a reasonably accurate view of the location 
of the Swedish and British parties. One reason for the differing figures is that this article defines the 
‘Old’ Left-Right in strictly economic terms. For the CMP, it is “a general scale dealing with social-
economic policy positions” (Benoit and Laver, 2007: 100) and since party position is the sum of right-
wing categories minus left-wing categories, then, if the proportion of both categories goes down, a 
party will tend to move towards the middle. An additional issue with the CMP data is that it conflates 
what this article calls ‘Old’ and ‘New’ politics dimensions. Consequently, if a party devotes a 
significant proportion of its’ manifesto to positive mentions of ‘Free enterprise’ but spends a lesser 
proportion on ‘Environmental protection’, it skews party position even though the latter may be just as 
important as the presence of the former. This means that what the CMP is telling us is how salient 
certain issues are for parties rather than their policy positions as such. 
